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Abstract 
 
In this study we investigate the role of information and communication technology (ICT) in 
conflicts of financial intermediation for financial access. The empirical evidence is based on 
contemporary (or current values) and non-contemporary (or lagged by a year) quantile 
regressions in 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011. The main findings are: First, 
the net effect of ICT in formalization for financial activity in the banking system is 
consistently beneficial with positive thresholds. The fact that corresponding, unconditional 
and conditional effects are persistently positive is evidence of synergy or complementary 
effects. Second, the net effect of ICT in financial informalization for financial activity in the 
financial system is negative with a consistent negative threshold. Hence, the positive 
(negative) complementarity of ICT and financial formalization (informalization) is an 
increasing (decreasing) function of financial activity. Policy measures on how to leverage 
the synergy or complementarity between ICT and financial formalization in order to enhance 
financial access are discussed. 
Keywords: Allocation efficiency; financial sector development; ICT 
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1. Introduction  
The policy relevance of this inquiry has at least five motives, notably: (i) the high 
penetration potential of information and communication technology (ICT) in Africa (ii) the 
need for domestic sources of finance to accommodate Africa’s investment needs; (iii) 
inconsistency in the measurement of financial development from the perspective of concerns 
about excess liquidity in African financial institutions; (iv) hitherto unexplored literature on 
financial sector competition and (v) the need to account for existing levels of financial 
development when investigating the complementarity between ICT and financial intermediary 
sector development in financial access1. 
First, Africa is a very fertile ground for the development of ICT-oriented activities 
because, compared to other regions of the world that are experiencing ICT-growth 
stabilization, the penetration of mobile phones and internet on the continent is low, but 
growing in a promising way. As of 2010, the continent was characterised by an asymmetric 
development of ICT: 9.6% (41%) penetration rate for mobile phones (internet) (see Asongu, 
2015a; Penard et al., 2012). It follows that, ICT is an important policy tool that could be 
leveraged to address pressing policy syndromes like the lack of finance for the continent’s 
rising investment needs. This study employs ICT as a policy tool. 
Second, a broad stream of African business literature is consistent with the position that 
(i) lack of finance is a fundamental challenge to starting and doing business and (ii) there is 
need for domestic sources of finance after privatization projects have failed, for the most part, 
to bring-in the much needed foreign capital (Darley, 2012; Tuomi, 2011; Bartels et al., 2009; 
Rolfe & Woodward, 2004; Tchamyou, 2016). A step in the right direction towards addressing 
                                                 
1The conception of financial development employed in the paper is different from capital markets. We are 
exclusively concerned with short term finance or financial intermediary development. Moreover, ‘financial 
intermediary development’ and ‘financial development’ are used interchangeably throughout the study.  
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the underlying African business challenge could entail inter alia transforming mobilised 
deposits in the banking industry into credit for investment by economic operators.  
In the light of the above, African’s investment needs can be partly addressed by financial 
institutions if the potential for ICT is properly leveraged to enhance doing business 
conditions. This is essentially because ICT can reduce informational rents that limit financial 
access and increase doing of business constraints, notably, by: improving eligibility to bank 
lending and enhancing the availability of timely information for business operations (Batuo & 
Kupukile, 2010; Allen et al., 2011). 
Third, the suggested step in the second point sharply contrasts with the evidence that 
banking institutions on the continent of Africa are characterised for the most part by excess 
liquidity (Asongu, 2014a; Fouda, 2009; Saxegaard, 2006). Moreover, as far as we are aware, 
the literature has not tackled the surplus liquidity concern by defining and measuring financial 
development in the light of bank’s ability to transform mobilised deposits into credit for 
economic operators. Accordingly, this fundamental role of financial intermediation has been 
neglected by the bulk of literature in the area (Kablan, 2010; Kiyato, 2009; Al-Obaidan, 2008; 
Ataullah et al., 2004). The relevant literature on African financial development has, for the 
most part, considered financial intermediation efficiency through the prism of cost efficiency 
(Chen, 2009; Mensah et al., 2012); Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), technical efficiency 
(Kablan, 2009) and profit efficiency (Hauner & Peiris, 2005).We measure financial efficiency 
in this study as the ability of banks to fulfil their basic mission of transforming mobilised 
deposits into credit.  
Fourth, we introduce the perspective of financial sector development because the bulk of 
African literature has been skewed towards (i) more specific areas like bank concentration and 
bank participation (see O’Toole, 2014; Asongu, 2015b) and (ii) the sensitivity of financial 
development to financial reforms (see Arestis et al., 2002; Batuo & Kupukile, 2010). This 
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study steers clear of the mainstream literature by emphasising the concept of financial sector 
development. The introduction of this concept makes a twofold contribution to the literature, 
notably, it responds to the macroeconomic literature on calibrating financial development and 
it contributes to an evolving economic development field of non-traditional financial 
development by means of ICT. The twofold contribution also doubles as an empirical exercise 
that provides a practical means of dissociating the complementarity of ICT with various 
financial sectors for development. To this end, hitherto unexplored concepts of formalization, 
semi-formalization, informalization and non-formalization are introduced in Section 2.2.  
Fifth, the modelling approach is designed to account for existing levels of financial 
development. This addresses shortcomings in the recent literature in which linkages between 
information sharing and financial access have been modelled at the conditional mean of 
financial access. Two recent examples include Asongu et al. (2016) and Triki and Gajigo 
(2014) who have respectively employed Generalized Method of Moments and Probit models. 
We argue that blanket policy implications based on mean values of financial access may be 
ineffective unless they are contingent on existing levels of financial access and hence tailored 
differently across countries with low, intermediate and high levels of financial access. To this 
end, we employ contemporary (or current values) and non-contemporary (or lagged by a year) 
quantile regressions to assess the role of ICT in financial sector development throughout the 
conditional distributions of financial access.  
Noticeably from the discourse above, room is left to complement the existing literature in 
four main dimensions, notably the imperative to: (i) focus on a continent where the prospect 
of ICT-penetration is high (ii) address the surplus liquidity syndrome by calibrating financial 
allocation efficiency within the framework of the fundamental mission of banks which is to 
transform mobilized deposits into credit for economic operators, (iii) investigate how ICT 
affects financial sector development for financial access and (iv) model the investigated 
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relationships throughout the conditional distributions of financial access. As we shall 
substantiate in Section 2.1, the positioning of the inquiry also goes a long way to complement 
the spare literature on the nexus between ICT and financial access in Africa. This is 
essentially because a bulk of this literature has focused on South and East Asia where ICT 
penetration is intense.  
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Theoretical underpinnings and 
financial sector development are covered in Section 2. The data and methodology are 
discussed in Section 3 while Section 4 covers the empirical results and policy implications. 
Section 5 concludes with future research directions.  
 
2. Literature Review, Theoretical Underpinnings and Financial Sector Development 
2.1 Literature Review  
This section is discussed in two main strands. The first reviews the extant knowledge on 
information asymmetry and financial access whereas the second clarifies the notions of 
threshold and synergy employed in the study. In the first, it is important to note that the bulk 
of the literature on the nexus between ICT and financial access has focused on South and East 
Asia where the penetration of ICT is intense (Alafeef et al., 2011, 2012;Amin et al., 2012; 
Donner & Tellez, 2008; Duncombe & Boateng, 2009; Saleem & Rashid, 2011; Safeena et al., 
2012; Jain, 2013)2. Kirui et al. (2013) and Warren have established  how mobile banking 
mitigates poverty in rural communities while another stream of the literature is consistent with 
the position that telecommunication infrastructure is fundamental for the underlying financial 
inclusion (Maurer, 2008; Chan & Jia, 2011; Qiang et al., 2011; Singh, 2012; Mishra & Bisht, 
2013), especially in the provision of enabling conditions that eliminate waste on the one hand 
                                                 
2
 Accordingly, the recent bulk of financial development studies has to clearly articulate the nexus between ICT 
and financial access (Fowowe, 2014; Daniel, 2017; Chikalipah, 2017; Wale & Makina, 2017; Osah & Kyobe, 
2017; Bocher et al., 2017; Chapoto & Aboagye, 2017; Oben & Sakyi, 2017; Iyke & Odhiambo, 2017). 
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and on the other hand, match supply and demand (Muto & Yamano, 2009; Aker & 
Fafchamps, 2010).   
With regard to the second strand, the notions of threshold and synergy are consistent 
with recent financial development literature (see Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017; Tchamyou, 
2017). According to the authors, in an interactive regression: (i) a synergy effect is apparent 
when estimated conditional and conditional effects have the same sign while and (ii) a 
threshold effect is apparent when in a quantile regression, estimated effects either have an 
increasing tendency or a decreasing tendency throughout the conditional distribution of the 
dependent variable. In the latter scenario, positive thresholds are defined as decreasing 
negative or increasing positive estimated effects from the independent variables of interest 
and vice versa for negative thresholds. In the light of the insight, the notion of threshold 
adopted is different from, inter alia: minimum conditions for appealing effects (Cummins, 
2000); critical masses for desired impacts (Roller & Waverman, 2001; Batuo, 2015) and 
requirements for U-shaped and inverted U-shaped patterns (see Ashraf & Galor, 2013; 
Asongu  & Le Roux, 2017). 
 
2.2 Theoretical Underpinnings and Financial Sector Development 
Two main schools of thought have dominated the literature on the nexus between 
information sharing and financial development. Whereas the first focuses on how the risk 
features of bank assets can be transformed, the second is oriented towards mechanisms by 
which bank provision of liquidity can be strengthened. In addition, this stream of literature 
agrees with the perspective that the principal goal of financial intermediation in the banking 
sector should focus on allocation efficiency through optimal allocation of mobilised financial 
resources from lenders to borrowers or investors. Unfortunately, information asymmetry due 
to issues of moral hazard (adverse selection) from borrowers (lenders) limits intermediation 
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efficiency (see Claus & Grimes, 2003; Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017a, 
2017b).  
Consistent with Asongu et al. (2017), information asymmetry is focused on the study of 
transactional decisions in which one party of the transaction is better informed than the other. 
The underlying imbalance in information leads to a disequilibrium of transactional power 
which gives an edge to one party so that he/she takes decisions in his/her interest, to the 
detriment of the other party. Such decisions often translate into higher prices. Taking the 
example of the bank and borrower, the party which receives the loan is liable to moral hazard 
because the borrower may decide to conceal transactions for which the loan was granted in 
order to limit his/her financial obligation towards the bank. Conversely, the party that grants 
the loan may limit financial access through higher interest rates because of limited 
information about the borrower’s credit worthiness. The behavior of the bank in this latter 
scenario is termed as “adverse selection”.   This narrative is consistent with the bulk of 
literature on the relationship between information asymmetry and financial access (Asongu, 
2017; Domeher et al., 2017; Asongu & Biekpe, 2017; Ofori-Sasu et al., 2017;  Boadi et al., 
2017; Fanta, 2016). 
In the light of the above it is difficult to argue against the fact that information sharing by 
means of ICT contributes to reducing information asymmetry in the banking industry. ICT 
has been shown to enhance the diffusion of information between market participants in the 
developing world. Some of the documented advantages of ICT in easing access to finance 
include (i) mitigating information asymmetry (Aminuzzaman et al., 2003) and (ii) 
consolidating market participation and decreasing marketing cost (Muto & Yamano, 2009, p. 
1887). In summary, the intuition underpinning ICT in financial sector development for 
financial access is based on the documented evidence that ICT improves financial sector 
development (Asongu, 2013) and mitigates information asymmetry (Andonova, 2006).  
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In the light of the above, the theoretical connection between information sharing by 
means of ICT and financial sector development can be viewed from the perspective of 
adverse selection on the part of lenders in both the formal and informal financial sectors. Such 
an information sharing mechanism could benefit a lender in a given financial sector to the 
detriment of a lender in an opposing financial sector. This is essentially because, ceteris 
paribus, the shares in money supply of one financial sector may either increase or decrease if 
the corresponding shares of money supply in the opposing sector decrease or increase 
respectively. This theoretical background is consistent with recent literature on the relevance 
technology-driven information sharing for financial access (Asongu et al., 2017) and 
information sharing in financial sector development for financial access (Asongu &  
Nwachukwu, 2017). The latter study which is closest to the current inquiry has focused on 
information sharing in the perspectives of public credit registries and private credit bureaus.  
The link between information sharing offices and financial development can be viewed 
from the perspectives of moral hazard on the part of borrowers and adverse selection on the 
part of lenders. Information sharing offices provide banks or lenders with credit histories and 
information about borrowers which help in reducing high interest rates due to adverse 
selection from banks. Once borrowers have had access to finance, they may be liable to moral 
hazard because they can conceal real economic activities upon which the credit is based in 
order to limit the payment of their financial obligations towards the lender or bank. It is the 
responsibility of information sharing offices to discipline borrowers on the unhealthy 
consequences of noncompliance with their financial obligations. Often times, information 
sharing offices have to educate borrowers on the perils of defaulting on their debts and 
seeking refuge in the informal financial sector as a viable alternative to the formal financial 
sector. 
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The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) or International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
definition of the financial system has the shortcoming of not incorporating the informal 
financial sector. Whereas the IFS’ conception of the financial system from a ‘formal financial 
sector’ standpoint borders with the reality of developed economies where a substantial bulk of 
the monetary base circulates within the formal banking sector, this is not the case with the 
developing countries where just about 21 percent of the adults living on less than $2US a day 
possess a bank account (Caulderwood, 2015). It follows that much of the population in 
developing countries substantially depends on informal financial services (Asongu, 2014a).  
 
“Insert Table 1 here” 
 
The propositions summarised in Table 1 address the neglect of the informal financial 
sector by rethinking the mainstream financial system definition in developing countries. In 
essence, the propositions challenge the IMF’s IFS financial system definition by: (i) 
accounting for the informal sector in the definition, (ii) disentangling the existing definition 
into its semi-formal and formal components and (iii) emphasising the concept of financial 
sector development. In so doing, the propositions also respond to a stream of literature 
underlining the need to incorporate the neglected informal financial sector (Meagher, 2013; 
Adeusi et al., 2012; Aryeetey, 2005).  
Whereas Panel A shows indicators of the financial sector that are based on the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), those in Panel B are more aligned towards financial sector 
development in shares of the money supply. The concept of financial sector development for 
the latter is articulated by notions of non-formalization, informalization, semi-formalization 
and formalization. For example, financial informalization represents improvements in the 
money supply shares of the informal financial sector to the detriment of other financial sectors 
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(formal and semi-formal sectors). These propositions have been used in recent financial 
development literature (see Asongu, 2015b, 2015c). 
It is relevant to devote more space to clarify the notions of  "non-formalization”, 
“informalization”, “semi-formalization” and “formalization”. Financial formalization is the 
increase of shares in money supply in the formal financial sector to the detriment of other 
financial sectors (i.e. semi-formal and informal financial sectors). In the same vein, financial 
informalization is the progress of the informal financial sector at the expense of competing 
sectors (formal and semi-formal sectors). Within the same line of thought, semi-formalization 
is the growth of the semi-formal financial sector to the detriment of the formal and informal 
financial sectors. Financial non-formalization is the simultaneous development of the semi-
formal and informal financial sectors to the detriment of the formal financial sector. It is 
important note that the contending financial sectors are competing for shares in money 
supply. In what follows, we clarify the grouping of various financial sectors.  
Appendix 1, which is an extension of Steel (2006) categorizes various financial sectors as 
employed in this study.  In the table, formal finance reflects services that are within the 
regulation of other supervisory authorities and the central bank. Semi-formal finance which 
distinguishes between informal and formal finance, is the financial segment that may be 
defined as being in the formal financial sector, but not formally recognized as being in the 
formal financial sector. An eloquent example with which to articulate this semi-formal 
financial sector is microfinance. Conversely, informal finance represents the financial sector 
that is neither enforced via the legal system nor arranged though formal mechanisms. For 
instance, in the fourth column, developing countries are characterized with the last-two 
categories of “saving and lending”. 
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The main hypothesis tested in this study is that ICT complements formal financial 
development to increase financial access while it complements informal financial 
development to decrease financial access.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
The study assesses a panel of 53 African countries with annual data from the African 
Development Indicators (ADI) and the Financial Development and Structure Database 
(FDSD) of the World Bank for the period 2004-20113. 2004 coincides with the year in which 
information sharing offices (private credit bureaus and public credit registries) were 
introduced in Africa with the goal of increasing financial access and interbank competition, 
whereas the latest year in the FDSD is 2011. The scope of Africa has been justified in the 
introduction. 
In line with the engaged policy syndrome on excess liquidity issues, two financial 
development variables are employed. They are dynamics of allocation efficiency and activity. 
First, financial allocation efficiency which appreciates the ability to transform mobilised 
deposits into credit for economic operators is measured with the following two indicators.(i) 
banking-system-efficiency (with ‘banking system credit’ on ‘banking system deposits’) and 
(ii) financial-system-efficiency (with ‘financial system credit’ on ‘financial system deposits’). 
Second, financial activity or ability to grant credit is measured with (i) banking system 
activity (with ‘private domestic credit by deposit banks’) and (ii) financial system activity 
(with ‘private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions’).  
In accordance with the motivation in the introduction on the high potential for ICT 
penetration on the continent (see Penard et al., 2012), ICT is measured in terms of mobile 
                                                 
3Of the 54 African countries, South Sudan is not included because data for the country was not available before 
2011. 
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phone and internet penetrations (Tchamyou, 2016). Propositions 5 and 7 are used respectively 
for financial sector formalization and informalization. Proposition 6 on financial sector semi-
informalization is not used because of constraints in degrees of freedom while Proposition 8 is 
also not employed because of its very high degree of substitution with Proposition 7.  
We employ seven control variables: five non-dummy (foreign aid, public investment, 
trade, GDP growth and inflation) and two dummy (income levels and legal origins) indicators. 
The choice of the variables is consistent with recent financial development literature (Price  & 
Elu, 2014; Banya & Biekpe, 2017; Biekpe, 2011; Adjasi & Biekpe, 2006; Gossel & Biekpe, 
2014; Asongu, 2014c; Osabuohein & Efobi, 2013; Huang, 2005; Owusu & Odhiambo, 2014; 
Nyasha & Odhiambo, 2015a, 2015b). Whereas development assistance is theoretically 
expected to bridge the saving-investment gap in less developed countries (see Easterly, 2005), 
from a more pragmatic angle, the connection could be negative for at least two reasons: (i) a 
great portion of the disbursed funds is withheld in developed countries and (ii) a significant 
amount of the fund that reaches destination/recipient countries is siphoned off and deposited 
in tax havens that are within the jurisdictions of developed countries. While trade openness 
(Huang & Temple, 2005; Do & Levchenko, 2004) and investment (Huang, 2011) have been 
documented to be positively linked to financial development, the association may also be 
negative depending on the type of investment and balance of trade. From intuition and 
contrary to private investment, public investment may decrease financial development 
because of corruption and lobbying that are linked to procurement of public contracts. 
Moreover, a balance of trade deficit (surplus) is more likely to negatively (positively) affect 
financial development. The position that very high inflation is associated with less efficient 
banks is held by both theoretical (Huybens & Smith, 1999) and empirical (Boyd et al., 2001) 
articles. There is a consensus in the literature that economic prosperity in terms of GDP 
growth is linked to higher levels of financial development because of, inter alia greater 
14 
 
competition and availability of more funds for the purpose of investment (Jaffee & Levonian 
2001; Levine, 1997; Saint-Paul, 1992; Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1992).  
On the dummy variables, the classification into legal origins and income levels 
respectively builds on La Porta et al. (2008, p. 289) and Asongu (2014d, p. 364)4.English 
common law countries are expected to enjoy higher levels of financial access vis-à-vis their 
French civil counterparts because of political and adaptability channels (Beck et al., 2003). 
The stance of Jaffee and Levonian (2001) that high income countries enjoy better levels of 
financial access is broadly consistent with a within-Africa framework where middle income 
countries are associated with higher levels of financial development compared to their low 
income counterparts (Asongu, 2012a). Appendix 2 provides the definitions of variables as 
well as their corresponding sources. The summary statistics are disclosed in Appendix 3 
whereas Appendix 4 provides the correlation matrix. The correlation matrix enables the study 
to avoid concerns of multicollinearity that could bias estimated coefficients. The high 
correlation between financial development variables is resolved by employing the financial 
development variables in distinct specifications.  
3.2 Methodology 
In accordance with the motivation of the inquiry, the study accounts for existing levels of 
financial development in the modelling approach with the quantile regressions (QR) 
estimation technique. With the estimation strategy, the investigated relationships are 
established throughout the conditional distributions of the dependent variable or financial 
access (Koenker & Hallock, 2001; Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012). This 
enables the study to articulate countries with low, intermediate and high levels of financial 
access.  
                                                 
4There are four main World Bank income groups: (i) high income, $12,276 or more; (ii) upper middle 
income,$3,976-$12,275; (iii) lower middle income, $1,006-$3,975 and (iv) low income, $1,005 or less. 
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The extant literature on the sharing of information for better financial access has 
estimated parameters at the conditional mean of financial development (see Triki & Gajigo, 
2014; Asongu et al., 2016). While mean effects are important, it is also relevant to 
complement the existing literature with conditional impacts because policy recommendations 
based on blanket policies may not succeed unless they are contingent on initial levels of 
financial development and tailored varyingly across countries with low, intermediate and high 
levels of financial development (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017). Moreover, whereas 
techniques based on mean effects like Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) assume the presence of 
normally distributed error terms, the hypothesis of such normality is inconsistent with the QR 
technique5.  
The  th quantile estimator of financial development is obtained by solving for the 
optimization problem in Eq. (1), which is disclosed without subscripts for ease of presentation 
and simplicity.  
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where  1,0 . As opposed to OLS which is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations is  minimised. For 
instance the 10th decile or 90th decile (with  =0.10 or 0.90 respectively) are minimised by 
approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quintile of financial development or iy
given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/( ,(2) 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are examined only at the 
                                                 
5
 The statement is meant to articulate the perspective that estimated techniques (such as OLS) that are based on 
the presence of normally distributed error terms are more simplistic and less consistent with reality. 
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mean of the conditional distribution of financial development. For the model in Eq (2) the 
dependent variable iy  is a financial access indicator whereas ix  contains a constant term, ICT, 
Propositions, ICT×Proposition, foreign aid, trade, GDP growth, public investment, inflation, 
middle income and Common law. The specifications are tailored to have some bite on 
endogeneity by controlling for: the unobserved heterogeneity in terms of fixed effects and 
simultaneity with non-contemporary specifications.  
Consistent with Brambor et al. (2006) on the pitfalls of interactive regressions, estimates 
from the interactions are considered as conditional and marginal effects. Moreover, the 
overall or net effect is computed with conditional and unconditional impacts. In order to 
ensure that our empirical analysis does not suffer from spurious results owing to concerns of 
“non-stationarity”, we perform unit root tests and confirm that the variables are 
overwhelmingly stationary6.  
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Presentation of results 
The results are presented in two main sections: one on mobile phones and the other on the 
internet. The first (second) table of each section presents findings for financial allocation 
efficiency (financial activity). The left-hand-side (LHS) of each table presents contemporary 
regressions whereas the right-hand-side (RHS) shows non-contemporary regressions. The 
interest of lagging the independent variables on the RHS by one period is to have some bite 
on endogeneity (see Mlachila et al., 2014, p. 21). For each table, the baseline estimations in 
Panel A entail interactions between financial formalization and banking system finance, 
whereas Panel B entails robustness with financial informalization and financial system 
                                                 
6
 The variables are overwhelmingly stationary with the Fisher-type (Choi 2001) test. The following tests could 
not be performed because they require highly balanced datasets: The Levin–Lin–Chu (2002), Harris–Tzavalis 
(1999), Breitung (2000), Breitung and Das 2005) and The Hadri (2000). Im–Pesaran–Shin (2003) could also not 
be performed because of insufficient observations. The Fisher-type unit root tests results are available upon 
request.  
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finance. Regardless of the tables, consistent differences in mean estimated effects (from OLS) 
and conditional estimated impacts (from quantiles) justify the choice of the estimated 
technique.  
4.1.1 The Mobile Phone, Conflicts in Financial Intermediation and Financial Development 
The findings are discussed in terms of net effects which are computed with (i) the 
unconditional effect of financial sector development and (ii) the conditional or marginal effect 
with ICT. For example, in the 75th quartile of Panel A in Table 2, the unconditional effect of 
financial formalization (or Prop. 5) is -58.92 while the conditional impact with the mobile 
phone is (Mobile × Prop. 5) is 1.419. The corresponding net effect is -6.900 ([36.659 ×1.419] 
+ -58.92)7.  
The following findings can be established from Table 2 on linkages between ‘mobile 
phones, conflicts on financial intermediation and allocation efficiency’. In Panel A, the net 
effect of mobile phones in financial formalization for allocation efficiency in the banking 
system is negative in the 75th quartile on LHS and RHS; and also positive in the 50th quartile 
of the RHS. In Panel B, the net effect of mobile phones in financial informalization for 
allocation efficiency in the financial system is negative in the 50th and 75th quartiles in both 
contemporary and non-contemporary regressions.  
The following findings can be established from Table 3 on linkages between ‘mobile 
phones, conflicts in financial intermediation and financial activity’. In Panel A, the net effect 
of mobile phones on formalization for financial activity in the banking system is consistently 
positive with a positive threshold from the 25th quartile to the 90th decile. The fact that 
corresponding unconditional and conditional effects are consistently positive is evidence of 
synergy effects. In Panel B, the net effect of mobile phones in financial informalization for 
                                                 
736.659 is the mean value of mobile phone penetration.  
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financial activity in the financial system is negative with a consistent negative threshold on 
the RHS and a negative threshold from the 10th decile to the 75th quartile on the LHS.  
Positive thresholds are established when net effects consistently display decreasing 
negative magnitudes and/or increasing positive magnitude throughout the conditional 
distributions of finance. Conversely, negative thresholds are denoted by persistently 
increasing negative or decreasing positive net effects. Hence, evidence of a threshold 
tendency confirms the intuition of modelling based on existing levels of financial access, with 
the view that the financial development benefits from financial sector development and ICT 
may steadily increase or decrease concurrently with increasing initial levels of financial 
access. 
 
“Insert Table 2 here” 
“Insert Table 3 here” 
 
Most of the significant control variables display the anticipated signs. The unexpected 
negative effect of Common Law countries which is contrary to the law and finance theory of 
Beck et al. (2003) can be explained by recent literature on the law-finance nexus in Africa 
which suggests that French Civil Law countries dominate their English Common Law 
counterparts in terms of allocation efficiency because of inflation uncertainty (see Asongu, 
2012b). This is based on the fact, French Civil Law countries, which are in common currency 
unions for the most part, have opted for monetary stability instead of monetary independence. 
 
4.1.2 The Internet, Conflicts in Financial Intermediation and Financial Development 
The following findings can be established from Table 4 on linkages between ‘internet 
penetration, conflicts in financial intermediation and allocation efficiency’. In Panel A, the net 
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effect of internet penetration in financial formalization for allocation efficiency in the banking 
system is positive in the (i) 10th decile and 25th quartile on the LHS and (ii) 10th decile and 
50th quartile on the RHS. In Panel B, the net effect of internet penetration in financial 
informalization for allocation efficiency in the financial system is consistently negative with 
an inverted U-shape, for the most part.  
The following findings can be established from Table 5 on linkages between ‘internet 
penetration, conflicts in financial intermediation and financial activity’. In Panel A, the net 
effect of internet penetration in financial formalization for financial activity in the banking 
system is consistently positive with a positive threshold from the 10th decile to the 75th 
quartile, for the most part. The fact that corresponding unconditional and conditional effects 
are consistently positive is evidence of synergy effects. In Panel B, the net effect of ‘internet 
penetration in financial informalization for financial activity in the financial system’ is 
negative with a consistent negative threshold. Most of the significant control variables display 
the expected signs.  
 
 “Insert Table 4  here” 
“Insert Table 5 here” 
4.2 Further discussion of the main policy implications 
From a cross examination of Tables 2-5, two main consistent findings are apparent. On 
the one hand, the net effect of ‘ICT in financial formalization for financial activity in the 
banking system’ is consistently positive with positive thresholds. On the other, the net effect 
of ‘ICT in financial informalization for financial activity in the financial system’ is negative 
with a consistent negative threshold. These findings are broadly consistent with Asongu and 
Nwachukwu (2017) from the perspective of information sharing offices by means of public 
credit registries and private credit bureaus. Policy can increase the synergy effects from the 
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positive thresholds by leveraging on four main dimensions, namely, encouraging: mobile 
finance, partially integrated savings, ICT-banking and the use of credit registries as 
complementary information sharing mechanisms. The proposed policy directions are 
measures that can be tailored towards leveraging the synergy between ICT and financial 
formalization in order to enhance financial access. We engage the suggested policy directions 
chronologically. 
First, in the encouragement of mobile finance, policy should build on three principal 
advantages of mobile banking: (i) ICT endows users with the option of storing currency or 
value in an internet-connected mobile phone. Real accounts that are linked to the formal 
banking sector should be preferred to pseudo bank accounts that depend on users’ mobile 
operators, (ii) ICT enables users to convert stored value by cashing-in and/or cashing-out. 
Furthermore, such a conversion is associated with a formal bank account and the stored value 
can be used by banks to increase financial access.  
Second, partially-integrated savings accounts should be encouraged in place of savings 
bank accounts. ‘Partially integrated’-ICT savings that earn interest depend on the availability 
of bank accounts in formal banking establishments. Basic savings entail the employment of a 
standard ICT mobile transfer system like the M-PESA to store money. Policy should 
encourage the former option because it generates interest rates on the one hand and on the 
other hand, can be used to finance economic operators.  
Third, overall, ICT-banking should be encouraged in the formal banking sector. For 
instance, when a mobile phone with a savings account is connected to the internet and the 
formal banking sector, the following advantages can be leveraged: (i) Given that the 
subscriber identity module (SIM) is similar to a smartcard (or virtual bank card), the ICT can 
be employed to store value; (ii) ICT-banking can also be used as an automated teller machine 
(ATM) because it permits instant access to bank accounts used for transactions’ (iii) and by 
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enabling communications and transactions with formal banking institutions, ICT-banking also 
serves as a point of sale (POS) terminal.  
Fourth, information sharing offices can be employed to complement ICT in enhancing 
interbank development and financial access. Examples of such credit offices include private 
credit bureaus and public credit registries. This recommendation has a twofold motivation. On 
the one hand, information sharing offices enhance financial sector development in order to 
boost financial access and on the other, these credit offices also act as disciplining devices by 
discouraging borrowers from defaulting on their debts in the formal financial sector and 
resorting to the informal financial sector as a viable alternative to the formal sector.  
Another implication of the study that is both theoretical and practical is that information 
sharing mechanisms which decrease information asymmetry for financial access, promote the 
formal financial sector to the detriment of the informal financial sector. In other words, the 
reduction of information asymmetry by means of ICT is more beneficial to formal financial 
sector development compared to informal financial sector development. Given that monetary 
policy is ineffective in African countries (Weeks, 2010) partly because a great chunk of 
money supply circulates outside the formal financial sector, the theoretical/practical 
implications can be extended with an inference that,  the advent of ICT will decrease the 
shadow/informal financial sector and provide more enabling conditions for monetary policy 
effectiveness in Africa.  
 
5. Conclusions and further research directions 
In this study we have investigated the role of information and communication technology 
(ICT) in conflicts of financial intermediation for financial access. The empirical evidence is 
based on contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions in 53 African countries for 
the period 2004-2011. The relevance of the estimation technique builds on the argument that 
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blanket policy implications based on mean values of financial access may be ineffective 
unless they are contingent on existing levels of financial access and hence tailored differently 
across countries with low, intermediate and high levels of financial access. 
The following findings are established. First, the net effect of ICT in financial 
formalization for allocation efficiency in the banking system is selectively positive across the 
conditional distributions. Second, the net effect of ICT on financial informalization for 
allocation efficiency in the financial system is negative, with the negative connection more 
apparent in internet-oriented regressions. Third, the net effect of ICT in financial 
formalization for financial activity in the banking system is consistently positive with positive 
thresholds. The fact that corresponding unconditional and conditional effects are consistently 
positive is evidence of synergy effects. Fourth, the net effect of ICT in financial 
informalization for financial activity in the financial system is negative with a consistent 
negative threshold.  
Positive thresholds are established when net effects consistently display decreasing 
negative magnitudes and/or increasing positive magnitude throughout the conditional 
distributions of financial access. Conversely, negative thresholds are denoted by persistently 
increasing negative or decreasing positive net effects. Hence, evidence of a threshold 
tendency confirms the intuition of modelling based on existing levels of financial access, with 
the view that the benefits from financial sector development and ICT may steadily increase or 
decrease concurrently with increasing initial levels of financial access.  So, the positive 
complementarity of ICT and financial formalization is an increasing function of financial 
activity while the negative complementarity of ICT and financial informalization is a 
decreasing function of it. Policy measures on how to leverage the synergy between ICT and 
financial formalization in order to enhance financial access have been discussed.  
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The introduction of this concept of financial sector development makes a twofold 
contribution to the extant literature. It responds to the macroeconomic work on calibrating 
financial development and it contributes to an evolving economic development field of non-
traditional financial development by means of ICT. This twofold contribution also doubles as 
an empirical exercise that provides a practical means of dissociating the complementarity of 
ICT with various sectors on financial development.  
A caveat to the study is that the explanatory powers (i.e. Pseudo R²) in some quantiles are 
quite low. While this may be partly traceable to the contingency of the analysis on initial 
levels of financial development, it also reflects an exploratory dimension of the paper. This 
leaves room for further studies which could include alternative variables in the conditioning 
information set to assess how the investigated linkages and corresponding explanatory powers 
change across specifications, quantiles and financial development dynamics.  Future studies 
can also assess whether the established findings withstand empirical scrutiny within the 
context of other developing continents like Latin America and South Asia.  
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Table 1: Summary of propositions 
Panel A: GDP-based financial development indicators  
Propositions Name(s) Formula Elucidation Authors supporting the 
propositions  
Proposition  1 Formal  financial 
development  
Bank deposits/GDP Bank deposits8  here refer 
to demand, time and saving 
deposits in deposit money 
banks. 
Asongu and Nwachukwu 
(2017), Tchamyou et al. 
(2017) and Meniago and 
Asongu (2017). 
     
Proposition  2 Semi-formal  
financial 
development 
(Financial deposits – 
Bank deposits)/ GDP 
Financial deposits9 are 
demand, time and saving 
deposits in deposit money 
banks and other financial 
institutions. 
Asongu and Nwachukwu 
(2017), Tchamyou et al. 
(2017) and Meniago and 
Asongu (2017). 
     
Proposition  3 Informal  financial 
development 
(Money Supply – 
Financial 
deposits)/GDP 
 Asongu and Nwachukwu 
(2017), Tchamyou et al. 
(2017) and Meniago and 
Asongu (2017). 
     
 
Proposition  4 
Informal and semi-
formal financial 
development  
(Money  Supply –  
Bank deposits)/GDP 
 Demetriades and Hussein 
(1996), Abu-Bader and Abu-
Qarn (2008), Asongu and 
Nwachukwu (2017), 
Tchamyou et al. (2017) and 
Meniago and Asongu (2017). 
     
     
Panel B: Measures of financial sector importance  
  
Proposition 5 Financial 
intermediary 
formalization 
Bank deposits/ 
Money Supply (M2) 
From ‘informal and semi-
formal’ to formal financial 
development 
(formalization)10 . 
Asongu and Nwachukwu 
(2017), Tchamyou et al. 
(2017) and Meniago and 
Asongu (2017). 
     
Proposition 6 Financial 
intermediary ‘semi-
formalization’ 
(Financial deposits - 
Bank deposits)/ 
Money Supply 
From ‘informal and formal’ 
to semi-formal financial 
development (Semi-
formalization)11. 
Asongu and Nwachukwu 
(2017), Tchamyou et al. 
(2017) and Meniago and 
Asongu (2017). 
      
Proposition 7 Financial 
intermediary 
‘informalization’ 
(Money Supply – 
Financial deposits)/ 
Money Supply 
From ‘formal and semi-
formal’ to informal 
financial development 
(Informalisation)12. 
Asongu and Nwachukwu 
(2017), Tchamyou et al. 
(2017) and Meniago and 
Asongu (2017). 
     
Proposition 8 Financial 
intermediary ‘semi-
formalization and 
informalization’  
(Money Supply – 
Bank 
Deposits)/Money 
Supply  
Formal to ‘informal and 
semi-formal’ financial 
development: (Semi-
formalization and 
informalization) 13 
Asongu and Nwachukwu 
(2017), Tchamyou et al. 
(2017) and Meniago and 
Asongu (2017). 
     
N.B: Propositions 5, 6, 7 add up to unity (one); arithmetically spelling-out the underlying assumption of sector importance. 
Hence, when their time series properties are considered in empirical analysis, the evolution of one sector is to the detriment 
of other sectors and vice-versa.  
Source: Asongu (2015b).   
                                                 
8
 Lines 24 and 25 of the International Financial Statistics (October 2008).  
9
 Lines 24, 25 and 45 of the International Financial Statistics (2008).  
10
 “Accordingly, in undeveloped countries money supply is not equal to liquid liabilities or bank deposits. While in 
undeveloped countries bank deposits as a ratio of money supply is less than one, in developed countries this ratio is almost 
equal to 1.  This indicator appreciates the degree by which money in circulation is absorbed by the banking system.  Here we 
define ‘financial formalization’ as the propensity of the formal banking system to absorb money in circulation” (Asongu, 
2015b, p. 432). 
11
 “This indicator measures the rate at which the semi-formal financial sector is evolving at the expense of formal and 
informal sectors” (Asongu, 2015b, p. 432). 
12
 “This proposition appreciates the degree by which the informal financial sector is developing to the detriment of formal 
and semi-formal sectors” (Asongu, 2015b, p. 432).  
13
 “The proposition measures the deterioration of the formal banking sector in the interest of other financial sectors (informal 
and semi-formal). From common sense, propositions 5 and 8 should be almost perfectly antagonistic, meaning the former 
(formal financial development at the cost of other financial sectors) and the latter (formal sector deterioration) should almost 
display a perfectly negative degree of substitution or correlation”  (Asongu, 2015b, p. 432).  
25 
 
Table 2: Mobile Phones, Conflicts in Financial Intermediation and Allocation Efficiency  
             
 Panel A: Banking System Efficiency and Formalization (Prop. 5) 
 
 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  105.05*** 52.788*** 50.283*** 119.07*** 144.32*** 147.73*** 101.77*** 49.126*** 60.595*** 123.50*** 139.44*** 142.56*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile -0.769*** -0.711*** -0.225 -0.849*** -1.023*** -0.926* -0.849*** -0.767*** -0.770** -0.981*** -1.097*** -0.797** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.356) (0.001) (0.000) (0.087) (0.000) (0.000) (0.041) (0.002) (0.000) (0.017) 
Prop. 5 -17.540 7.266 37.302** -30.037 -58.92*** -25.715 -15.524 29.200* 19.705 -39.367* -59.25*** -18.716 
 (0.380) (0.535) (0.022) (0.147) (0.005) (0.588) (0.356) (0.053) (0.412) (0.085) (0.001) (0.580) 
Mobile×Prop. 5 0.989*** 0.807*** 0.364 1.233*** 1.419*** 0.886 1.066*** 0.791*** 1.024** 1.373*** 1.511*** 0.758* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.214) (0.000) (0.000) (0.149) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.050) 
GDP growth  -0.00004 0.329 0.163 -0.091 -0.243 -0.681 0.134 0.364 0.370 0.456 -0.236 -0.526 
 (1.000) (0.251) (0.609) (0.833) (0.559) (0.305) (0.682) (0.139) (0.513) (0.315) (0.406) (0.336) 
Inflation -0.121** -0.027 -0.071* -0.125** -0.146 -0.109* -0.217** -0.192*** -0.257** -0.239* -0.161*** -0.228*** 
 (0.038) (0.361) (0.089) (0.042) (0.120) (0.079) (0.024) (0.001) (0.010) (0.059) (0.000) (0.001) 
Public Invt.  -1.386*** -1.008*** -1.767*** -1.453*** -0.761* -1.500 -1.427*** -1.344*** -2.027*** -1.532*** -0.628 1.636*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.097) (0.182) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) (0.147) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid  -0.101 0.123 -0.002 -0.010 -0.196 -0.283 -0.020 -0.118 0.303 0.022 -0.079 -0.390 
 (0.679) (0.644) (0.993) (0.974) (0.501) (0.654) (0.934) (0.698) (0.439) (0.949) (0.770) (0.339) 
Trade  -0.124** -0.150** -0.153** -0.193*** -0.125** -0.072 -0.105* -0.182*** -0.122 -0.177** -0.084 -0.079 
 (0.019) (0.010) (0.016) (0.005) (0.044) (0.582) (0.060) (0.009) (0.175) (0.022) (0.124) (0.426) 
Middle Income 3.981 3.524 -1.793 -1.769 4.130 26.497*** 4.203 2.281 -2.139 -1.505 4.980 24.394*** 
 (0.267) (0.462) (0.712) (0.753) (0.367) (0.001) (0.271) (0.681) (0.753) (0.185) (0.253) (0.000) 
Common Law -6.620** -2.027 -8.187** -8.460* -6.651* -19.70*** -5.747* -3.962 -5.043 -7.034 -7.151** -17.39*** 
 (0.021) (0.558) (0.039) (0.060) (0.080) (0.002) (0.051) (0.284) (0.371) (0.173) (0.037) (0.000) 
Net  effects na na na na -6.900 na na 58.197 na 10.965 -3.858 na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.186 0.151 0.134 0.111 0.132 0.182 0.188 0.162 0.137 0.109 0.149 0.209 
Fisher  6.30***      8.48***      
Observations  316 316 316 316 316 316 280 280 280 280 280 280 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial System Efficiency and Informalization (Prop.7) 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 
  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
 
            
Constant  93.357*** 67.257*** 72.636*** 78.423*** 85.845*** 127.02*** 90.232*** 72.376*** 72.785*** 77.156*** 85.086*** 132.52*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile 0.578*** 0.240*** 0.517*** 0.817*** 0.914*** 0.693*** 0.625*** 0.320*** 0.579*** 0.874*** 0.884*** 0.538*** 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) 
Prop.7 33.696 -16.219 28.342 77.608*** 93.077*** 63.760 36.809*** -19.404 37.031 76.150*** 76.907*** 25.732 
 (0.124) (0.221) (0.112) (0.000) (0.000) (0.150) (0.073) (0.262) (0.138) (0.000) (0.000) (0.579) 
Mobile×Prop.7 -2.851*** -1.680*** -2.511*** -3.226*** -3.374*** -3.768*** -3.240*** -2.189*** -3.242*** -3.786*** -3.364*** -3.458*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  -0.071 0.338 0.585 -0.013 -0.501 -0.858 0.156 0.526** 0.328 0.216 -0.212 -0.492 
 (0.834) (0.112) (0.197) (0.963) (0.166) (0.259) (0.654) (0.034) (0.596) (0.411) (0.435) (0.537) 
Inflation -0.089 -0.136*** -0.001 -0.034 0.030 -0.076 -0.159 -0.201*** -0.383*** -0.011 -0.064** -0.141 
 (0.142) (0.000) (0.969) (0.402) (0.391) (0.312) (0.137) (0.000) (0.000) (0.682) (0.040) (0.126) 
Public Invt.  -1.770*** -1.131*** -1.995*** -1.116*** -1.030** -1.300** -1.959*** -2.001*** -1.982*** -1.369*** -0.921** -1.669*** 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.023) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.025) (0.001) 
Foreign Aid  -0.045 0.001 0.191 0.166 0.072 -0.702 0.044 0.306 0.542 0.246 -0.022 -0.323 
 (0.872) (0.995) (0.530) (0.420) (0.771) (0.304) (0.872) (0.342) (0.206) (0.186) (0.925) (0.516) 
Trade  -0.193*** -0.137** -0.157** -0.298*** -0.287*** -0.251* -0.166*** -0.170*** -0.137 -0.262*** -0.219*** -0.207 
 (0.001) (0.013) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.051) (0.008) (0.009) (0.134) (0.000) (0.000) (0.153) 
Middle Income 6.575* 0.626 -1.111 3.467 7.099* 25.788*** 6.959* 5.367 -0.621 5.995* 9.129*** 32.376*** 
 (0.082) (0.876) (0.835) (0.349) (0.076) (0.004) (0.083) (0.290) (0.933) (0.084) (0.000) (0.000) 
Common Law -10.85*** -6.576** -12.06*** -9.699*** -12.00*** -19.83*** -9.848*** -6.948* -10.951* -11.00*** -11.44*** -27.04*** 
 (0.001) (0.048) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000 (0.001) (0.003) (0.056) (0.073) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Net  effects na na na -40.653 -30.610 na -81.969 na na -62.640 -46.413 na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.476 0.151 0.145 0.177 0.236 0.382 0.494 0.161 0.153 0.187 0.247 0.390 
Fisher  11.08***      17.57***      
Observations  316 316 316 316 316 316 280 280 280 280 280 280 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. Mobile: Mobile 
phone penetration rate. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) 
signify nations where financial activity is least. It is important to note that because of unbalanced panel and corresponding issues in degrees 
of freedom, the estimation output may not contain all the 53 sampled countries. 
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Table 3: Mobile Phones, Conflicts in Financial Intermediation and Financial Activity 
             
 Panel A: Banking System Activity and Formalization  
 
 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  -11.992** -5.577*** -3.962* 0.485 1.593 3.348 -10.406** -4.505** -0.289 -0.497 -1.996 1.888 
 (0.012) (0.000) (0.056) (0.898) (0.811) (0.656) (0.017) (0.015) (0.909) (0.919) (0.824) (0.645) 
Mobile -0.194 -0.363*** -0.343*** 0.452*** -0.422*** -0.663*** -0.213* -0.474*** -0.443*** -0.446*** -0.377*** -0.685*** 
 (0.118) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.067) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) 
Prop.5 43.963*** 22.786*** 20.804*** 28.245*** 34.965*** 35.176*** 41.307*** 21.444*** 16.261*** 31.297*** 42.108*** 29.210*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Mobile×Prop5 0.428*** 0.495*** 0.514*** 0.711*** 0.723*** 1.155*** 0.482*** 0.635*** 0.632*** 0.708*** 0.691*** 1.300*** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  -0.094 -0.169*** -0.216*** -0.181* -0.006 0.025 -0.028 -0.203*** -0.155** -0.041 -0.025 0.217** 
 (0.522) (0.004) (0.002) (0.098) (0.961) (0.887) (0.856) (0.001) (0.048) (0.753) (0.881) (0.033) 
Inflation -0.028 -0.041*** -0.009 -0.010 0.006 -0.010 -0.057 -0.064*** -0.091*** -0.160*** -0.020 -0.024** 
 (0.185) (0.000) (0.226) (0.471) (0.715) (0.590) (0.207) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.283) (0.048) 
Public Invt.  -0.836*** -0.185** -0.053 -0.299*** -0.399** -0.508** -0.932*** -0.177* -0.108 0.376*** -0.719*** -0.417*** 
 (0.000) (0.010) (0.490) (0.002) (0.016) (0.028) (0.000) (0.096) (0.276) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Foreign Aid  0.013 -0.033 0.002 -0.048 -0.207 -0.261 0.016 -0.006 0.042 -0.075 -0.197 -0.197* 
 (0.897) (0.451) (0.962) (0.538) (0.125) (0.214) (0.879) (0.906) (0.491) (0.465) (0.252) (0.098) 
Trade  -0.006 -0.011 -0.023** -0.049*** -0.061*** -0.046 0.002 -0.009 -0.011 -0.047** -0.036 -0.015 
 (0.806) (0.206) (0.029) (0.004) (0.009) (0.146) (0.943) (0.452) (0.425) (0.032) (0.257) (0.386) 
Middle Income 3.524** -2.350*** -1.258 0.307 6.827*** 16.609*** 3.323* -2.086** -1.681 0.403 3.953 16.254*** 
 (0.023) (0.000) (0.146) (0.827) (0.001) (0.000) (0.050) (0.021) (0.127) (0.827) (0.139) (0.000) 
Common Law -6.308*** -5.577*** -0.735 -7.499*** -8.750*** -6.279** -5.611*** -0.720 -0.895 -6.753*** -9.651*** -4.920*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.305) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.006) (0.364) (0.343) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Net  effects 59.653 40.932 39.646 54.309 61.469 77.517 72.954 63.137 57.757 77.783 87.478 114.566 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.499 0.236 0.244 0.270 0.364 0.495 0.496 0.231 0.220 0.259 0.364 0.506 
Fisher  32.56***      32.37***      
Observations  316 316 316 316 316 316 280 280 280 280 280 280 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial System Activity and Informalization (Prop.7) 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 
  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
 
            
Constant  37.090*** 15.777*** 11.885*** 28.366*** 40.958*** 50.009*** 34.904*** 15.068*** 15.364*** 28.602*** 34.649*** 39.799*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile 0.430*** 0.187*** 0.299*** 0.445*** 0.602*** 0.543*** 0.497*** 0.175*** 0.331*** 0.488*** 0.694*** 0.745*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prop.7 -41.73*** -17.72*** -7.000* -23.91*** -34.93*** -42.11*** -36.30*** -15.02*** -10.70*** -23.96*** -31.58*** -29.21*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.063) (0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) 
Mobile×Prop.7 -1.452*** -0.750*** -1.016*** -1.419*** -1.816*** -1.575*** -1.691*** -0.676*** -1.369*** -1.590*** -1.924*** -2.161*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  -0.070 -0.144** -0.092 -0.053 -0.041 0.303 0.024 -0.117** -0.124 -0.098 0.199 0.319** 
 (0.661) (0.024) (0.321) (0.561) (0.830) (0.105) (0.888) (0.033) (0.114) (0.409) (0.155) (0.044) 
Inflation -0.042* -0.041*** -0.005 -0.009 -0.001 -0.015 -0.071 -0.066*** -0.055*** -0.155*** -0.012 -0.024 
 (0.073) (0.000) (0.562) (0.462) (0.954) (0.449) (0.163) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.459) (0.170) 
Public Invt.  -1.082*** -0.358*** -0.254*** -0.384*** -0.710*** -1.080*** -1.243*** -0.349*** -0.256*** -0.435*** -0.529*** -0.702*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid  0.002 -0.034 0.091 -0.031 -0.177 -0.382 0.027 -0.040 0.056 -0.007 -0.143 -0.265 
 (0.980) (0.534) (0.145) (0.637) (0.325) (0.118) (0.807) (0.473) (0.318) (0.938) (0.261) (0.110) 
Trade  -0.036 -0.010 -0.012 -0.057*** -0.080** -0.062* -0.023 -0.009 -0.008 -0.047** -0.056** -0.060** 
 (0.169) (0.283) (0.338) (0.000) (0.016) (0.075) (0.435) (0.432) (0.467) (0.020) (0.027) (0.032) 
Middle Income 4.108** -1.527* -0.990 2.206* 7.351** 14.029*** 4.084** -1.422* -1.889* 1.849 4.480** 14.74*** 
 (0.013) (0.068) (0.347) (0.062) (0.011) (0.000) (0.023) (0.071) (0.053) (0.266) (0.036) (0.000) 
Common Law -9.272*** -0.984 -1.360 -10.16*** -12.02*** -13.07*** -8.546*** 0.253 -2.098** -8.770*** -11.55*** -11.24*** 
 (0.000) (0.185) (0.131) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.746) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Net  effects -94.958 -66.964 -73.709 -117.080 -154.166 -145.522 -147.329 -39.801 -60.886 -82.274 -157.907 -171.099 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.691 0.202 0.202 0.292 0.483 0.636 0.700 0.199 0.199 0.292 0.485 0.639 
Fisher  29.73***      35.56***      
Observations  316 316 316 316 316 316 280 280 280 280 280 280 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. Mobile: Mobile 
phone penetration rate. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) 
signify nations where financial activity is least. It is important to note that because of unbalanced panel and corresponding issues in degrees 
of freedom, the estimation output may not contain all the 53 sampled countries. 
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Table 4: Internet, Conflicts in Financial Intermediation and Allocation Efficiency 
             
 Panel A: Banking System Efficiency and Formalisation (Prop.5) 
 
 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  98.208*** 37.605*** 51.371*** 105.51*** 126.72*** 151.38*** 95.510*** 26.070* 49.412*** 122.79*** 125.53*** 137.53*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet -4.673*** -3.016*** -2.524 -6.365*** -6.757*** -5.743** -5.393*** -2.383* -2.347 -9.068*** -7.844*** -6.754*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.173) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.007) (0.091) (0.337) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
Prop.5 -7.063 22.069* 31.430** -7.222 -17.214 -27.938 -7.955 49.439*** 32.740** -31.400** -22.635 -15.791 
 (0.690) (0.064) (0.042) (0.529) (0.464) (0.415) (0.608) (0.002) (0.049) (0.042) (0.347) (0.575) 
Internet×Prop.5 5.894*** 3.812*** 3.791* 8.265*** 8.210*** 5.840** 6.906*** 3.065* 3.597 11.506*** 9.746*** 7.149*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.083) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.004) (0.067) (0.219) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) 
GDP growth  0.026 0.394* 0.177 0.005 -0.066 0.152 0.176 0.483* 0.351 0.397 0.014 -0.173 
 (0.934) (0.066) (0.607) (0.983) (0.893) (0.771) (0.580) (0.082) (0.229) (0.240) (0.978) (0.598) 
Inflation -0.126** -0.013 -0.078* -0.119*** -0.026 -0.070 -0.220** -0.234*** -0.337*** -0.219** -0.139*** -0.180*** 
 (0.031) (0.684) (0.091) (0.002) (0.568) (0.131) (0.029) (0.001) (0.000) (0.015) (0.001) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  -1.352*** -1.073*** -1.558*** -1.478*** -0.840* -1.468*** -1.333*** -1.455*** -1.981*** -1.136*** -0.936 -1.725*** 
 (0.002) (0.009) (0.001) (0.000) (0.096) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.000) (0.001) (0.101) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid  -0.122 0.209 0.008 -0.048 -0.425 -0.828* -0.028 0.136 0.338 -0.186 -0.219 -0.615** 
 (0.571) (0.508) (0.976) (0.794) (0.178) (0.073) (0.890) (0.706) (0.248) (0.451) (0.496) (0.026) 
Trade  -0.152*** -0.140** -0.141** -0.242*** -0.277*** -0.131 -0.128** -0.123 -0.117* -0.242*** -0.254*** -0.039 
 (0.005) (0.024) (0.046) (0.000) (0.000) (0.195) (0.024) (0.160) (0.092) (0.000) (0.002) (0.649) 
Middle Income 3.562 3.268 -3.102 0.112 8.076 24.701*** 3.193 -3.642 -2.936 -1.329 10.656* 20.673*** 
 (0.340) (0.537) (0.553) (0.975) (0.154) (0.000) (0.418) (0.569) (0.574) (0.774) (0.070) (0.000) 
Common Law -4.776 -2.771 -6.769 -8.455*** -10.842** -14.65*** -4.167 -5.733 -4.929 -5.641 -8.144* -20.14*** 
 (0.105) (0.492) (0.128) (0.003) (0.019) (0.009) (0.161) (0.234) (0.261) (0.128) (0.098) (0.000) 
Net  effects na 48.101 57.292 na na na na 70.348 na 47.093 na na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.184 0.140 0.144 0.129 0.113 0.189 0.187 0.152 0.144 0.122 0.131 0.211 
Fisher  4.73***      4.16***      
Observations  312 312 312 312 312 312 278 278 278 278 278 278 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial System Efficiency and Informalization (Prop.7) 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 
  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
 
            
Constant  111.62*** 51.626*** 74.537*** 100.36*** 114.31*** 120.75*** 106.06*** 61.859*** 77.825*** 91.770*** 106.93*** 123.61*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet 2.507*** 2.576*** 2.705*** 2.708*** 3.287*** 5.225*** 3.233*** 2.717*** 2.972*** 3.074*** 5.438*** 5.334*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prop. 7 -7.966 -15.160 7.017 34.803** 26.419 51.414* -1.491 -23.585* -2.176 38.768*** 44.235** 45.065** 
 (0.736) (0.130) (0.642) (0.037) (0.386) (0.054) (0.945) (0.083) (0.922) (0.004) (0.035) (0.042) 
Internet×Prop.7 -16.36*** -13.86*** -13.81*** -13.91*** -18.13*** -32.95*** -20.09*** -16.23*** -14.82*** -16.42*** -29.32*** -34.12*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  -0.008 0.454** -0.705* -0.042 -0.664 -0.226 0.220 0.555*** 0.335 0.361 -0.131 -0.066 
 (0.981) (0.011) (0.091) (0.905) (0.306) (0.537) (0.523) (0.009) (0.383) (0.220) (0.761) (0.859) 
Inflation -0.137** -0.044 -0.173*** -0.090* -0.043 -0.084** -0.213* -0.243*** -0.250** -0.145* -0.125*** -0.155*** 
 (0.022) (0.111) (0.001) (0.097) (0.465) (0.026) (0.067) (0.000) (0.010) (0.063) (0.001) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  -1.713*** -0.725* -1.658*** -1.556*** -1.086 -1.203*** -1.817*** -1.553*** -1.924*** -1.312*** -0.315 -1.289*** 
 (0.002) (0.061) (0.000) (0.000) (0.132) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.492) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid  -0.284 0.097 -0.036 -0.016 -0.134 -0.131 0.179 0.439 0.209 -0.057 -0.330 -0.192 
 (0.268) (0.690) (0.900) (0.952) (0.753) (0.700) (0.456) (0.145) (0.590) (0.784) (0.228) (0.413) 
Trade  -0.277*** -0.113** -0.206*** -0.331*** -0.378*** -0.345*** -0.249*** -0.127* -0.152* -0.294*** -0.382*** -0.377*** 
 (0.000) (0.037) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.050) (0.088) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Middle Income 7.662* 1.319 2.808 2.889 15.345** 41.633*** 7.305* 2.673 -1.325 4.945 13.125** 41.378*** 
 (0.063) (0.728) (0.583) (0.571) (0.035) (0.000) (0.092) (0.565) (0.849) (0.219) (0.014) (0.000) 
Common Law -7.512** -0.656 -4.777 -10.222** -11.491* -10.43*** -6.594* -4.787 -5.428 -8.105** -10.608** -9.695** 
 (0.032) (0.844) (0.255) (0.015) (0.061) (0.009) (0.065) (0.178) (0.359) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) 
Net  effects -119.573 -109.712 -87.194 -60.091 na -173.370 -87.194 -138.544 -103.278 -73.249 -155.786 -187.701 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.431 0.165 0.163 0.159 0.173 0.416 0.446 0.165 0.156 0.153 0.197 0.444 
Fisher  7.83***      28.049***      
Observations  312 312 312 312 312 312 278 278 278 278 278 278 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. Mobile: Mobile 
phone penetration rate. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) 
signify nations where financial activity is least. It is important to note that because of unbalanced panel and corresponding issues in degrees 
of freedom, the estimation output may not contain all the 53 sampled countries. 
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Table 5: Internet, Conflicts in Financial Intermediation and Financial Activity,  
             
 Panel A: Banking System Activity and Formalization (Prop. 5) 
 
 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  -10.160** -7.415*** -1.341 4.524 2.884 -0.122 -7.813 -7.589*** -1.036 4.550 2.909 -2.670 
 (0.021) (0.000) (0.399) (0.396) (0.285) (0.985) (0.136) (0.000) (0.675) (0.294) (0.533) (0.646) 
Internet -1.234 -1.701*** -2.173*** -4.953*** -5.331*** -3.558*** -1.968 -1.771*** -2.218*** -5.909*** -5.883*** -2.720*** 
 (0.276) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.236) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prop.5 36.65*** 22.999*** 13.268*** 20.376*** 26.751*** 37.257*** 32.463*** 21.686*** -12.78*** 14.854** 21.022*** 38.064*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.002) (0.000) 
Internet×Prop.5 3.020** 2.710*** 3.834*** 7.549*** 8.356*** 6.092*** 4.202** 3.060*** 4.190*** 9.017*** 9.321*** 5.429*** 
 (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  -0.139 -0.121** -0.140*** -0.185 -0.103 -0.108 -0.072 -0.131*** -0.073 -0.107*** 0.144 -0.124 
 (0.238) (0.048) (0.006) (0.270) (0.193) (0.356) (0.537) (0.001) (0.270) (0.000) (0.305) (0.229) 
Inflation -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.047*** -0.031 -0.006 -0.039*** -0.075** -0.065*** -0.093*** -0.038 -0.019 -0.072*** 
 (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.181) (0.460) (0.005) (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) (0.244) (0.177) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  -0.531*** -0.151 -0.150** -0.325* -0.361*** -0.472*** -0.677*** -0.192** -0.285*** -0.411*** -0.441*** -0.391*** 
 (0.000) (0.147) (0.028) (0.056) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.018) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid  0.031 0.034 0.161*** -0.026 0.068 -0.006 0.059 0.070 0.175*** 0.075 0.150 -0.194** 
 (0.655) (0.591) (0.000) (0.823) (0.293) (0.946) (0.406) (0.104) (0.005) (0.405) (0.137) (0.018) 
Trade  -0.001 -0.013 -0.015* -0.045* -0.041*** -0.043* 0.012 0.0006 0.001 -0.025 -0.010 0.024 
 (0.984) (0.173) (0.072) (0.085) (0.001) (0.061) (0.563) (0.935) (0.916) (0.214) (0.643) (0.194) 
Middle Income 0.672 -2.077* -0.227 0.160 1.130 7.416*** 0.428 -1.956*** -1.246 0.905 2.022 4.056*** 
 (0.614) (0.057) (0.770) (0.942) (0.357) (0.000) (0.762) (0.007) (0.281) (0.594) (0.333) (0.006) 
Common Law -4.341*** -1.990** -2.592*** -5.679*** -9.974*** -5.083*** -3.990** -1.810*** -2.932*** -4.156*** -9.859*** -7.112*** 
 (0.005) (0.018) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Net  effects 57.252 41.486 39.423 71.875 83.755 78.816 61.129 42.561 43.438 76.367 84.609 75.100 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.684 0.302 0.318 0.392 0.539 0.614 0.705 0.314 0.318 0.404 0.544 0.638 
Fisher  42.01***      46.35***      
Observations  312 312 312 312 312 312 278 278 278 278 278 278 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial System Activity and Informalization (Prop. 7) 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 
  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
 
            
Constant  39.402*** 13.525*** 10.803*** 25.167*** 39.865*** 51.217*** 36.786*** 13.129*** 10.365*** 25.294*** 39.809*** 48.574*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet 2.511*** 1.526*** 2.393*** 2.821*** 3.453*** 4.601*** 3.170*** 1.770*** 2.823*** 3.379*** 4.100*** 5.103*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prop.7 -50.44*** -14.17*** -6.302* -20.30*** -32.86*** -30.53*** -44.34*** -14.45*** -5.536 -19.61*** -32.20*** -32.29*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.065) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.106) (0.008) (0.000) (0.001) 
Internet×Prop. 7 -8.876*** -5.496*** -8.292*** -9.322*** -13.32*** -20.07*** -11.41*** -5.874*** -9.771*** -11.66*** -16.18*** -20.24*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  -0.098 -0.105 -0.133 -0.232* 0.033 -0.067 -0.015 -0.055 -0.073 -0.092 0.245* 0.005 
 (0.486) (0.106) (0.134) (0.097) (0.809) (0.622) (0.914) (0.342) (0.287) (0.575) (0.085) (0.972) 
Inflation -0.083*** -0.052*** -0.044*** -0.056*** -0.043*** -0.078*** -0.112** -0.079*** -0.085*** -0.189*** -0.068*** -0.102*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.005) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  -0.765*** -0.252** -0.072 -0.228 -0.476*** -0.765*** -0.954*** -0.361*** -0.242** -0.501*** -0.552*** -0.666*** 
 (0.000) (0.033) (0.508) (0.144) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.015) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid  -0.094 -0.008 0.090 0.012 -0.173* -0.361*** -0.051 0.027 0.169** 0.050 -0.209* -0.327*** 
 (0.317) (0.905) (0.202) (0.903) (0.087) (0.006) (0.598) (0.674) (0.012) (0.661) (0.061) (0.006) 
Trade  -0.063** -0.017 -0.022* -0.060** -0.101*** -0.133*** -0.046* -0.008 -0.008 -0.043 -0.094*** -0.118*** 
 (0.018) (0.119) (0.088) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.091) (0.410) (0.522) (0.102) (0.000) (0.000) 
Middle Income 2.088 -0.669 0.342 1.859 5.192*** 10.709*** 1.839 -0.899 -0.269 1.644 4.807** 7.210*** 
 (0.186) (0.119) (0.783) (0.355) (0.007) (0.000) (0.273) (0.341) (0.826) (0.452) (0.029) (0.002) 
Common Law -6.315*** -1.342 -1.874* -6.343*** -9.918*** -10.41*** -5.844*** -0.806 -2.135** -5.512*** -8.982*** -9.933*** 
 (0.000) (0.110) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.330) (0.027) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Net  effects -110.992 -51.663 -62.870 -83.894 -123.729 -167.447 -122.179 -54.522 -72.193 -99.154 -142.579 -170.367 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.736 0.276 0.320 0.411 0.549 0.675 0.754 0.289 0.323 0.407 0.564 0.698 
Fisher  29.81***      33.79***      
Observations  312 312 312 312 312 312 278 278 278 278 278 278 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. Mobile: Mobile 
phone penetration rate. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) 
signify nations where financial activity is least. It is important to note that because of unbalanced panel and corresponding issues in degrees 
of freedom, the estimation output may not contain all the 53 sampled countries. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Segments of the financial system by degree of formality in Paper’s context  
Paper’s context Tiers Definitions Institutions Principal Clients 
 
Formal 
financial 
system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMF  
Definition 
of Financial 
System 
from 
International 
Financial 
Statistics 
(IFS) 
 
Formal 
Financial sector 
(Deposit Banks) 
 
Formal 
banks 
 
 
 
 
Licensed by 
central bank 
 
Commercial and 
development 
banks  
 
Large businesses, 
Government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Semi-
formal  
and 
informal 
financial 
systems 
 
 
 
Semi-formal 
financial sector 
(Other Financial 
Institutions) 
Specialized 
non-bank 
financial 
institutions 
Rural banks, 
Post banks, 
Saving and 
Loan 
Companies, 
Deposit taking 
Micro Finance 
banks  
 
Large rural 
enterprises, Salaried 
Workers, Small and 
medium enterprises  
 
 
Other non-
bank 
financial 
institutions 
Legally registered 
but not licensed as 
financial 
institution by 
central bank and 
government 
 
 
Credit Unions, 
Micro Finance 
NGOs 
 
 
Microenterprises, 
Entrepreneurial poor 
 
 
Missing 
component 
in IFS 
definition 
 
 
Informal 
financial sector 
 
 
Informal 
banks 
Not legally 
registered at 
national level 
(though may be 
linked  to a 
registered 
association) 
 
Savings 
collectors, 
Savings and 
credit 
associations, 
Money lenders 
 
 
 
Self-employed poor 
Source: Authors 
 
Appendix 2: Definitions of variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables  Sources 
Banking System Efficiency BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank 
(FDSD) 
Financial System Efficiency FcFd Financial credit on Financial deposits World Bank 
(FDSD) 
BankingSystem Activity  Prcb Private domestic credit from deposit banks 
(% of GDP) 
World Bank 
(FDSD) 
Financial System Activity Prcbof Private domestic credit from financial 
institutions (% of GDP) 
World Bank 
(FDSD) 
Information and 
CommunicationTechnology (ICT) 
Mobile Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people) World Bank 
(WDI) 
Internet Internet penetration(per 100 people) World Bank 
(WDI) 
Financial Sector Competition  Prop. 5 Financial Sector Formalization  Asongu (2014a, 
2015bc)   
Prop. 7 Financial Sector Informalization 
Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP Growth (annual %) World Bank 
(WDI) 
Inflation  Infl Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank 
(WDI) 
Public Investment PubIvt Gross Public Investment (% of GDP)  World Bank 
(WDI) 
Development Assistance NODA Total Net Official Development Assistance 
(% of GDP)  
World Bank 
(WDI) 
Trade openness  Trade Imports plus Exports in commodities (% of 
GDP) 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
Middle Income Middle I Middle and UpperIncome Countries ($1,006 
or more) 
Asongu (2014d) 
Low Income  Low I Low Income Countries($1,005 or less) 
Common Law Common 
L 
English Common Law Countries  La Porta et al. 
(2008) 
Civil Law Civil L Civil Law Countries  
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database.  
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Appendix 3: Summary Statistics (2004-2011) 
  
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations 
  
     
 
Financial 
Access 
BankingSystem Efficiency (BcBd)  68.118 27.725 14.804 171.85 402 
Financial System Efficiency (FcFd) 68.118 27.725 14.804 171.85 402 
Banking System Activity (Pcrb) 72.722 35.884 22.200 252.88 377 
Financial System Activity (Pcrbof) 21.571 24.154 0.010 149.77 379 
  
     
Fin. Sector 
Development 
Financial Formalization 0.773 0.168 0.235 1.469 377 
Financial Informalization 0.219 0.168 -0.469 0.764 377 
  
     
ICT Mobile Phone Penetration 36.659 32.848 0.214 171.51 420 
Internet Penetration  6.822 8.852 0.031 51.00 414 
       
 
Control 
Variables 
Economic Prosperity (GDPg) 4.996 4.556 -17.66 37.998 404 
Inflation 7.801 4.720 0 43.011 357 
Public Investment 74.778 1241.70 -8.974 24411 387 
Development Assistance  10.396 12.958 0.027 147.05 411 
Trade Openness (Trade) 80.861 32.935 24.968 186.15 392 
       
Income 
Levels and 
Legal 
Origins  
Low Income Countries  0.509 0.500 0.000 1.000 424 
Middle Income Countries  0.490 0.500 0.000 1.000 424 
English Common Law 0.415 0.493 0.000 1.000 424 
Civil Law 0.584 0.493 0.000 1.000 424 
       
S.D: Standard Deviation.Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. 
Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions. GDPg: 
GDP growth 
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Appendix 4: Correlation Analysis (Uniform sample size: 291) 
  
             
Financial Access ICT FS Development ControlVariables Fixed Effects  
Fin. Efficiency Fin. Activity         Income Levels  Legal Origins   
BcBd FcFd Prcb Pcrbof Mobile Internet Prop.5 Prop.7 GDPg Inflation PubIvt NODA Trade Middle I. Low I. Common L. Civil L.  
1.000 0.859 0.490 0.495 0.117 0.140 0.119 -0.097 -0.016 -0.144 -0.169 -0.133 -0.176 0.073 -0.073 -0.047 0.047 Bcbd 
 1.000 0.583 0.743 0.224 0.149 0.384 -0.365 -0.056 -0.097 -0.149 -0.179 -0.189 0.132 -0.132 0.071 -0.071 FcFd 
  1.000 0.922 0.523 0.707 0.591 -0.580 -0.092 -0.089 -0.055 -0.343 0.093 0.401 -0.401 0.136 -0.136 Pcrb 
   1.000 0.495 0.558 0.685 -0.676 -0.088 -0.073 -0.057 -0.324 0.019 0.356 -0.356 0.191 -0.191 Pcrbof 
    1.000 0.629 0.416 -0.392 -0.192 -0.136 0.088 -0.496 0.195 0.515 -0.515 0.103 -0.103 Mobile  
     1.000 0.379 -0.370 -0.082 -0.025 -0.024 -0.373 0.117 0.422 -0.422 0.076 -0.076 Internet 
      1.000 -0.983 -0.004 0.008 0.128 -0.246 0.119 0.398 -0.398 0.435 -0.435 Prop.5 
       1.000 0.018 -0.061 -0.125 0.224 -0.105 -0.363 0.363 -0.462 0.462 Prop.7 
        1.000 -0.169 0.129 0.122 0.037 -0.022 0.022 0.009 -0.009 GDPg 
         1.000 -0.081 -0.0004 -0.006 -0.116 0.116 0.152 -0.152 Inflation  
          1.000 0.059 0.130 0.079 -0.079 -0.169 0.169 PubIvt 
           1.000 -0.309 -0.603 0.603 -0.068 0.068 NODA 
            1.000 0.502 -0.502 0.068 -0.068 Trade 
             1.000 -1.000 0.087 -0.087 Middle I. 
              1.000 -0.087 0.087 Low I. 
               1.000 -1.000 Common L. 
               -1.000 1.000 Civil L. 
                  
BcBd: Bank credit on bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks.Pcrbof: Private domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions. 
ICT: Information & Communication Technology. Mobile: Mobile phone penetration. Internet: Internet penetration. Prop.5: Financial Sector Formalization. Prop. 7: Financial Sector Informalization. GDPg: GDP 
growth. Popg: Population growth. PubIvt: Public Investment. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. Middle I: Middle Income. Low. I: Low Income. Common L: Common Law: Civil L.: Civil Law. Info: 
Information. 
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